New Map after disintegration of Pakistan

New Map after disintegration of Pakistan
6 news states in South Asia

Tuesday, August 15, 2006



SYED Jamaluddin said...

A Nuclear Pakistan-Threat to entire humanity

Is it not a great sin on the part of entire humanity to allow a country full of fanatic people in government who can display their hatred for Christians and Jews and now Hindus by using the nuclear force against them. One must not ignore the possibility that Pakistan is a country of uncertainty where any thing can happen at any time. The unpredictability nature of Pakistan’s military dictatorship combined with hypocritic role of ISI can cause dangers to the entire humanity. Although, the pretence on the part of Pakistan’s present regime is glaringly seen by the Western world that Pakistan is a socalled ally of USA in the War-on-Terror, but, is it going to be a long term or permanent feature ?…….. Ofcourse not. Pakistan’s existence itself is a great threat to the entire world peace for the sole reason that Pakistan is now possessing nuclear weapons. Who will stop Pakistan from using such Nuclear weapons ? Are we expecting any Messiah to land on any part of this world to dispossess Pakistan from its nuclear weapons. This expectation shall indeed be absurd. President George Bush could not find Weapons of Mass Destruction in the deserts of Iraq and he is equally negligent if he fails to find any reasonable reason to trace and destroy the Nuclear weapons (WMD) possessed by Pakistan.

The attitude of North Korea is greatly influenced and encouraged by nuclear capability of Pakistan. Since the Western world as well as USA being the sole World Power have decided to ignore the illegitimate possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, this has caused new zeal and commitment for the North Koreans to move on to provoke the entire world by openly declaring themselves as « infant nuclear power ». Today, the American satellites are watching the movement of North Koreans who are busy in moving stuff from one place to the other in connection with their ongoing nuclear ambitions, but, the problem is that despite having sufficient evidence, nothing can be done beyond speeches and condemnation. Pakistan is responsible for this sort of chaos.

Similarly, it is due to Pakistan’s unlawful activity of making nuclear weapons which also made Iran to come forward and do the same activity. It is indeed not a hidden fact that Pakistan DID provide technical support and expertise to both North Korea and Iran. No one can deny this glaring fact that Pakistan is responsible for illegal smuggling of technical know-how to North Korea and Iran through its planted brokers in Malaysia and United Arab Emirates. Under such circumstances, is it not necessary to disintegrate Pakistan in order to make sure that the terror which is born in Pakistan should be eliminated right from its roots. If civilized nations want to keep their eyes closed by neglecting to disintegrate Pakistan in next few years, this negligence shall certainly cause a great setback to the entire humanity. Pakistan is a country which is evil in its nature. The world deserves to be told about the consequences if Pakistan is left untouched and unattacked. It is for the international welfare that Pakistan should be divided in at least 5 parts under the supervision and due interference of the United Nations.

In order for us to understand how exactly Pakistan’s nuclear programme got into existence, it is better to go back some 40 years when the formation of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission took place. This was indeed the most unfortunate event in the history of mankind that a country having evil designs got the opportunity to launch its nuclear programme by ridiculing the international community. In 1965, the then President Ayub Khan took some initial steps in response to the emerging of Indian nuclear threat. The murder convict called Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the founder of Pakistan's Nuclear Program, initially as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later as President and Prime Minister. Pakistan's nuclear program was launched after the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 war with India, when Bhutto initiated a program to develop nuclear weapons with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972. Basically, the motivation came from the military elite of Punjab who were scared of their own lives and were feeling fearful of their women to be raped by Indian army in the event of any possible Indian attack on the remaining Pakistan i.e. former West Pakistan. Hence, they pressurised Bhutto to allocate regular funds for the nuclear program. This was for this sole reason that Pakistan still lacks an extensive civil nuclear power infrastructure, and its weapons program is not as broad as India's. Much of its nuclear program is focused on weapons applications. Initially, Pakistan focused on the plutonium path for building a nuclear weapon. Plutonium can be obtained from fuel that has been reprocessed from nuclear power plants, and in October 1974 Pakistan signed a contract with France for the design of a reprocessing facility for the fuel from its power plant at Karachi and other planned facilities. However, over the next two years Pakistan's international nuclear collaborators withdrew as Pakistan's nuclear ambitions became more apparent. The French were among the last to withdraw at the end of 1976, following sustained pressure from the United States. A major advance jump to Pakistan's nuclear program was the arrival of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1975, who brought with him the plans for uranium enrichment centrifuges, and lists of sources of the necessary technology. On this basis, Pakistan initially focused its development efforts on highly enriched uranium (HEU), and exploited an extensive clandestine procurement network to support these efforts. A.Q. Khan evidently persuaded the government to work with Uranium (as compared to Plutonium) because Plutonium involves more arduous and hazardous procedures and cumbersome and expensive processes. Pakistan's activities were initially centered in a few facilities. A.Q. Khan founded the Engineering Research Laboratories at Kahuta in 1976, which later to became the Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL).

In March 2005 Benazir Bhutto said Pakistan may have had a nuclear weapon long before that. She said her father, former prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had told her from his prison cell that preparations for a nuclear test had been made in 1977. "... he expected Pakistan to have its first nuclear test in ... in August 1977. I was in his conduit to the person who was actually running the nuclear program who is no longer alive now. His name was Mr. Munir and he was chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He told us that the nuclear test had been delayed to December 1977, and then he told us the nuclear test had been indefinitely delayed." It is unlikely that this would have been a test with appreciable nuclear yield, since at that time Pakistan would not have had an appreciable inventory of fissile material.

Dr. Samar Mubarik Mand, member Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, has said that the team of Atomic Energy Commission developed the design of atomic bomb in 1978 and had successfully conducted a cold test after developing the first atomic bomb in 1983.

A number of United States laws, amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, applied to Pakistan and its program of nuclear weapons development. The 1976 Symington Amendment stipulated that economic assistance be terminated to any country that imported uranium enrichment technology. The Glenn Amendment of 1977 similarly called for an end to aid to countries that imported reprocessing technology--Pakistan had from France. United States economic assistance, except for food aid, was terminated under the Symington Amendment in April 1979.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country of paramount geostrategic importance. In a matter of days, the United States declared Pakistan a "frontline state" against Soviet aggression and offered to reopen aid and military assistance deliveries. When the Reagan administration took office in January 1981, the level of assistance increased substantially. Presidential waivers for several of the amendments were required. The initial package from the United States was for US$3.2 billion over six years, equally divided between economic and military assistance. A separate arrangement was made for the purchase of forty F-16 fighter aircraft.

Aside from Afghanistan, the most problematic element in Pakistan's security policy was the nuclear question. President Zia had inherited a pledge that for domestic reasons he could not discard, and he continued the nuclear development program. Zia inherited an ambitious program from Bhutto and continued to develop it out of the realization that, despite Pakistan's newly acquired weaponry, it could never match India's conventional power and that India either had, or shortly could develop, its own nuclear weapons.

In 1985 the Solarz Amendment was added to prohibit aid to countries that attempt to import nuclear commodities from the United States. In the same year, the Pressler Amendment was passed; referring specifically to Pakistan, it said that if that nation possessed a nuclear device, aid would be suspended. Many of these amendments could be waived if the president declared that it was in the national interests of the United States to continue assistance.
Even after the invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan almost exhausted United States tolerance, including bungled attempts to illegally acquire United States nuclear- relevant technology and a virtual public admission in 1987 by the head of Pakistan's nuclear program that the country had developed a weapon. As long as Pakistan remained vital to United States interests in Afghanistan, however, no action was taken to cut off United States support. For the remainder of Zia's tenure, the United States generally ignored Pakistan's developing nuclear program. But the issue that after Zia's death led to another cutoff of aid was Pakistan's persistent drive toward nuclear development.
Initial Pakistani attempts to handle the bilateral nuclear relationship with India led nowhere, but a significant step was a nonformalized 1985 agreement that neither India nor Pakistan would attack the other's nuclear facilities. Zia asked India to agree to several steps to end the potential nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. One of these measures was the simultaneous signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The second step was a joint agreement for inspection of all nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan also proposed a pact between the two countries to allow for mutual inspection of sites. And, finally, Pakistan proposed a South Asian nuclear-free zone. It appeared that Zia was looking for a way to terminate the costly Pakistani program. But in order to sell this idea in Pakistan, he required some concessions from India. Termination would also get him out of difficulties the program was causing with the United States, including the curtailment of aid in 1979.
These proposals were still on the table in the early 1990s, and were supplemented by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's call for a roundtable discussion among Pakistan, India, the United States, Russia, and China on nuclear weapons in South Asia.
Pakistan's dependence on China grew as Western export controls and enforcement mechanisms have grown more stringent. China's nuclear assistance predates the 1986 Sino-Pakistani atomic cooperation agreement, with some of the most critical transfers occurring from 1980 through 1985. China is reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, as well as sufficient HEU for a few weapons. The 25-kiloton design was the one used in China's fourth nuclear test, which was an atmospheric test using a ballistic missile launch. This configuration is said to be a fairly sophisticated design, with each warhead weighing considerably less than the unwieldy, first-generation US and Soviet weapons which weighed several thousand kilograms. As of 1989 it was suggested that Pakistan had a workable bomb weighing only 400 pounds. Pakistan Foreign Minister Yakub Khan was present at the Chinese Lop Nor test site to witness the test of a small nuclear device in May 1983, giving rise to speculation that a Pakistani-assembled device was detonated in this test.
Evidently the jump-start provided by A.Q. Khan's trove of documents was an insufficient basis for a dependable Uranium program. Chinese assistance in the development of gas centrifuges at Kahuta was indicated by the presence of Chinese technicians at the facility in the early 1980s. The uranium enrichment facility began operating in the early 1980s, but suffered serious start up problems. In early 1996 it was reported that the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory had received 5,000 ring magnets, which can be used in gas centrifuges, from a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation.
Perhaps in response to the persistent problems with the Uranium program, around the time of the signing of the 1986 Sino-Pakistani atomic cooperation agreement, Pakistan evidently embarked on a parallel Plutonium program. Built with Chinese assistance, the heavy water reactor at Khushab is the central element of Pakistan's program for production of plutonium and tritium for advanced compact warheads. The Khushab facility, like that at Kahuta, is not subject to IAEA inspections. Khushab, with a capacity variously reported at between 40 and 70 MWT, was completed in the mid-1990s, with the start of construction dating to the mid-1980s.
In March 2005 Benazir Bhutto said her government had a nuclear capability when she came into office the first time in 1988, ten years before Pakistan's first nuclear test. Ms. Bhutto said Pakistan had all the components for nuclear weapons, but never assembled them until India set off several tests in 1998. "When I became Prime Minister I was told we had not put together the bomb. We had the components of the bomb. So, when is a chicken a chicken? Is it a chicken when you have it in separate parts but you don't put it together? Or is it a chicken when you actually put it together? And although we had the components of a nuclear weapon, we took the conscious decision not to put together a nuclear weapon, which is why when India detonated it took us some time to put together the weapon and actually have our own tests."
The Pakistan Peoples Party [PPP] government evolved the Benazir Nuclear Doctrine in April 1989. This was done to protect Pakistan's nuclear assets and to give confidence to the world community which was deeply concerned about the nuclear program. Under this doctrine, Islamabad undertook not to put together the components of a nuclear device unless its security was threatened and also not to export nuclear technology to any third country. This doctrine followed discussions between Islamabad and Washington in 1988 and 1989. It was announced during the Benazir Bhutto state visit to Washington at the invitation of the first President Bush in April 1989. Later Washington had certain issues in this regard which it wished to discuss with Prime Minister Bhutto in the summer of 1990. This discussion with the special envoy of the Bush administration could not take place because the Foreign Office was unable to coordinate the meeting. At the time, the Prime Minister was travelling to different countries mustering support for the Kashmir dispute for a scheduled Foreign Ministers meeting of the Organisation of Islamic countries. Once the PPP government was sacked on August 6, 1990, Washington cancelled the four and a half billion dollar assistance package as well as the sale of sixty F-16s which the Benazir government had negotiated.
In 1993, when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto formed the second PPP government, she consulted the armed forces officials with regard to what had happened in the summer of 1990 to raise concerns in Washington. The PPP government wanted to ensure that there would be no slippages which could pose a threat to the nuclear policy or the nuclear assets. Following this concern, the armed forces came up with a plan to protect the command and control system and prevent any individualistic action. An officer of the armed forces was made in charge of the command and control system and reported to the army chief who in turn reported to the Prime Minister.
On 28 May and 30 May 1998 Pakistan conducted at least two nuclear weapons tests. These tests came slightly more than 2 weeks after India carried out 5 nuclear tests of its own, and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India (the two countries have fought 3 wars). In addition, Pakistan's President Rafiq Tarar declared a state of emergency, citing "threat by external aggression to the security of Pakistan." The United States had been attempting to persuade Pakistan not to test (and to head off a potential nuclear arms race in South Asia) by offering potential economic and military benefits, but this effort did not succeed. Pakistan already had been subject to limited U.S. sanctions since 1990 under the Pressler Amendment, when $650 million in military and humanitarian aid had been cut off as a result of an inability by the President to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device.
As was the case following India's nuclear tests, President Clinton, as required by law (including the Glenn Amendment, part of the Arms Export Control Act) announced that the United States would impose sanctions on Pakistan. These sanctions, among other things, could stem the flow of financial assistance into Pakistan, potentially causing severe harm to the Pakistani economy. With $37 billion in foreign debt (more than half of the country's total Gross Domestic Product, or GDP), a monthly trade deficit of $150 million, foreign exchange reserves of only $1.3 billion, and interest payments of $200-$500 million due each month, Pakistan can ill afford any suspension or cutoff in international assistance. Overall, Pakistan is considered far more vulnerable to economic sanctions than India.
In October 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had agreed to lend Pakistan $1.52 billion -- including $935 million under an enhanced, low-interest-rate, enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) -- over three years as part of an economic reform program. (The first $208 million tranche was released in October 1997.) The IMF money was considered important not only on its own account but also because it facilitates Pakistan's ability to borrow from commercial sources by increasing the country's financial credibility. Without the IMF, some economists believed foreign lenders could call in their loans, leading to a crisis of confidence in Pakistan's economy and a run on the country's freely-convertible currency, the rupee. Pakistan also receives money from other international lending organizations, including the World Bank.
President Bush formally lifted sanctions against India and Pakistan 22 September 2001 in a special memorandum to Secretary of State Colin Powell. The sanctions were imposed in response to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs and testing. Powell said on NBC's "Meet the Press" September 23 that lifting these sanctions, which had been under consideration for some time, sends an important signal that "we will stand by our friends who stand by us."
In March 2003 President Bush lifted sanctions against Pakistan that were imposed following the 1999 bloodless coup that brought President Pervez Musharraf to power. A White House statement said President Bush decided to lift the sanctions because it will "facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan" and help in efforts to fight international terrorism. Pakistani cooperation was key to US military action against the Taleban government in neighboring Afghanistan and al-Qaida terrorists thought responsible for the September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington.
By December 2003 Pakistani government had launched an investigation into whether figures in Pakistan's nuclear program may have provided nuclear-weapons technology to Iran or other countries. The US State Department said Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf assured the United States more than a year earlier that any such activity had ceased. Officials were reluctant to speak about what nuclear-export activity the United States believes Pakistan was engaged in before the Bush administration took office. But officials at both the State Department and White House said the United States continued to accept at face value an assurance made in 2003 by President Musharraf that Pakistan was no longer involved in such proliferation. The assurance was conveyed during what he said was a "very specific" conversation between Mr. Musharraf and Secretary of State Colin Powell on the proliferation issue in October 2002. That telephone talk had followed a flurry of press reports, denied at the time by Pakistan, that that country had been secretly aiding North Korea's nuclear program. In December 2003 The United States welcomed the Pakistani government's investigation and debriefing of prominent nuclear scientists about alleged technology exports. Those questioned are said to include aides to Abdul Qadeer Khan, who's considered the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. I information Iran has provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, in recent weeks has strengthened suspicions that Pakistan sold Iran key nuclear secrets, including how to build uranium-enrichment centrifuges. A 10 November 2003 report by IAEA Director-General Mohammed El-Baradei on Iran's nuclear program stated that Tehran had received nuclear assistance from "several external sources."

On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal.
[announced] YIELD
[boosted device?] 28 May 1998 25-36 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device 28 May 1998 12 kiloton
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Fission device 30 May 1998 12 kiloton 4-6 kiloton
Fission device not detonated 12 kiloton --
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.
According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.
Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.
Satellite Imagery of Pakistan's May 28 and May 30 nuclear testing sites

Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.

In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.

Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.

Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.

In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.
According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.

China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance. According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.

On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on terrorism.

Several sources, such as Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain that Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."

Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.

In view of the above arguments, it is now compulsory that Pakistan should be dispossessed of nuclear weapons immediately either through diplomatic means or by force. Leaving nuclear weapons in the hands of Pakistan should be deemed to be an act of immorality on the part of the United Nations. Why should United Nations allow a terrorist country like Pakistan to become a well-known threat for the entire humanity. It is, therefore, mandatory on the part of the National Security Council of UN to pass a resolution to dispossess Pakistan of nuclear weapons along with the disintegration of Pakistan.

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StorminNorman said...

While you have collected quite a few facts from the history you seem to contradict yourself along the line as you progress in your compilation.
You need to work harder to come up with a dramatization that fits the scenario and the point you are attempting to make.
I dont see you giving it a fair try and are resorting to a method of description that reflects you inexperience on this matter in substance and you appear to be maligning the fact to suit your thought, compliments to the brain that doesnt think itself yet attempts to dress an object with some underlying animosity.
In the eyes of a retired US soldier with some in depth knowledge I cant sem to agree wth te manner you appear to be attempting a revenge of some sort and only goes to reflect on the person behind this writing which in short appears to be very unhappy from Pakistan and goes beyond limits in trying to achieve the most un-doable and without any valid reason.
I would be very interested to understand whose agent you happen to be?

SYED Jamaluddin said...


Tablighi Jamaat was formed by WAHABI Government of Saudi Arabia in order to spread their message in India. History is itself a great witness to this fact that certain Ulema from Deoband were invited by the then King of Saudi Arabia who had offered to them money and support to establish a massive campaign to "combat" Sunniism in India. Hence, Maulana Ilyas along with his other supporters agreed to formation of a particular Jamaat to follow a specified agenda of the Saudi Kingdom. The penetration into Indian religious circles was not an easy job, hence, required consistent funds and work. Saudi Kingdom never stopped funding of Tablighi Jamaat till today. The most glaring evidence of this moral and financial support for Tablighi Jamaat is their welcome on the British, American and Australian soils since the Saudi Kingdom assured these nations that Tablighi Jamaat was working on a specific agenda and had nothing to do with propagating Islam or provoking Christianity. It is also interesting to note that Tablighi Jammat has not even bothered to obtain "go-ahead" from learned Islamic scholars of India since Tablighi Jamaat is of the opinion that Saudi Kingdom which follows WAHABIAT as their brand of Islam is the only authority on this earth to legitimize the functions of Tablighi Jamaat.

Please see below Fatwa of Shaykh 'Abdul-'Azeez ibn Baaz regarding the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh

Question: I went out with the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh to India and Pakistan. We used to congregate and pray in masaajid within which there were graves and I heard that the salaah in a masjid within which there is a grave is invalid. What is your opinion of my salaah and should I repeat them? What is the ruling about going out with them to these places?

Response: Indeed, the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh do not have real knowledge pertaining to issues of 'aqeedah so it is not permissible to go out with them except for the one who has real knowledge of the correct 'aqeedah of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah. In this, he can enlighten them, advise them and co-operate with them in good because they are active in their affairs. However, they are in need of more knowledge from those who can enlighten them amongst the scholars of Tawheed and Sunnah. May Allaah grant everyone understanding of the religion and firmness upon it.

As for the salaah in the masaajid within which are graves, then it is incorrect and it is obligatory upon you to repeat all that you did (in those masaajid) due to that which the Prophet (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam) said:

((Allaah has cursed the Jews and the Christians who have taken the graves of their Prophets' as places of worship)) - it's authenticity is agreed upon.

Also, his (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam) statement:

((Indeed those before you used to take the graves of their Prophets' and pious people as places of worship, so do not take the graves as places of worship, for certainly I prohibit you from that)), transmitted by Muslim in his Saheeh.

And the ahaadeeth on this subject are numerous - and with Allaah lies all success and may Allaah send prayers upon our Prophet Muhammed, his family and his companions.

Another Fatwa:
Fatwa of the Shaykh Muhammed Naasiruddeen al-Albaanee regarding Tablighi Jamaat:

Question: What is your opinion concerning the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh? Is it permissible for a student of knowledge or other than him to go out with them under the guise of inviting to (the path of) Allaah?

Response: The Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh (TJ)does not uphold the manhaj of the Book of Allaah and the Sunnah of His Messenger (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam) and that which our Pious Predecessors were upon.

And if the situation was such, then it is not permissible to go out with them because it defies our manhaj in calling to the manhaj of the Pious Predecessors. So in the path of inviting to Allaah, then an 'aalim can go out with them but as for those (ignorant - without knowledge) who go out with them, then it is obligatory upon them to remain in their countries and (study Islaam) seek knowledge in their masaajid until there graduates from amongst them people of knowledge who hold study circles inviting to the path of Allaah.

As long as the situation is like that, it is upon the student of knowledge to invite these people (those from Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh) to study the Book of Allaah and the Sunnah and invite people to it.

And the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh, with respect to da'wah to the Book and the Sunnah, do not intend by it a starting point, rather they consider that to be a divided call (da'wah)/approach; And because of this, they most resemble the Jamaa'ah of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen.

They say their da'wah is based upon the Book of Allaah and the Sunnah, however this is mere idle talk for certainly they have no 'aqeedah upon which they are united (which unites them) - so you find some are Maatureedee, others are Ash'aree, whilst others are Soofee and even some who have no madhhab (affiliation to any particular ideology).

This is because their da'wah is built upon amassing (the people), then gathering together and culturising/instructing them, and in reality they do not really have any culture. More than half a century has passed and there has not appeared from amongst them a scholar.

As for us, then we say instruct them, then gather together, such that the gathering together is based upon a foundation in which there is no doubt.

So the da'wah of the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh is that of the Soofiyyah, they call to good manners, as for correcting the differing 'aqeedah of the group, then they do not exert themselves one iota. This is because they believe this will cause differences (and splitting apart).

It came to pass that a brother, Sa'd al-Husayn had much correspondence with the leader of the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh in India or Pakistan and it became clear from that they acknowledge (belief in) intercession and seeking help (from other than Allaah) and many other such things. And they require their people (members) to make bay'ah (oath of allegiance) based upon four issues: amongst them the Naqshbandiyyah methodology. So it is upon every tableeghee (one who ascribes to the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh) to make bay'ah of these fundamentals (issues).

A questioner may ask: Indeed this group has corrected its faults (returned to Allaah) as a result of the efforts of many individuals and quite possibly many non-Muslims have accepted Islaam at their hands. Is this not sufficient (proof) for the permissibilty of going out with them and participating in that which they call to?

So we say: Indeed we know these words and hear them a lot and know them to emanate from the Soofiyyah! For example, there is a Shaykh whose 'aqeedah is incorrect and does not know anything about the Sunnah. Instead they deceitfully take from the wealth of the people, so together with this, many open sinners seek forgiveness from them!

So every group which invites to good, then it is imperative they should be in adherence (to the Qur.aan and the Sunnah), and (this) our approach is pure, so what are they (others) calling to?

Are they calling to adherence to the Book of Allaah and the Sunnah of the Messenger (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam) and the ;aqeedah of the Pious Predecessors, abandoning blind following of the madhhabs to such an extent that they adhere to the Sunnah over and above their madhhab!? So the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh do not have a knowledge-based (manhaj), rather, their manhaj is according to the place where they are to be found, so they change their "colours" to suit themselves

Now the role of Tablighi Jamaat has further expanded. On one hand, they are collecting funds from Saudi Kingdom for propagating a new brand of Islam (WAHABIAT) while on the other, they are sponsoring "brain-washing factories" to produce new minds who consider TERRORISM as legitimate and fully Quranic. This poisonous preaching of their brand of Islam has already begun damaging the very structure of Islam in the modern world.

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SYED Jamaluddin said...


Finally, today the 26th day of August 2006, Punjab's brutal military dictatorship succeeded to kill Baluch leader NAWAB AKBAR BUGTI being their vicious attempt to combat freedom movement of great Baluch nation. The disintegration of Pakistan is not very far. Independent Baluchistan will soon appear on the world map along with independent Sindhudesh, Pakhtoonistan and Jinnahpur.

Syed Jamaluddin
TEL +33 627477980
FAX +1 775 269 9669